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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
first amendment in the area of border searches,
just as it has for the fourth amendment, 52 to uphold
12 The requirement for search and seizure in a customs
border inspection is not probable cause, but mere sus-
picion that a violation has occurred. 19 U.S.C. § 482
(1964); 19 U.S.C. § 1582 (1964). See Henderson v.
United States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967); Rivas v.
United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966); Annot.,
6 A.L.R. Fed. 317 (1971).
The protection against unreasonable search and
seizure guaranteed by the fourth amendment has been
held to extend to first-class mail when in the custody
administrative censorship of obscenity for any
purpose-private or commercial. Stanley may well
be confined to its facts, so that the right to possess
obscenity will remain only a passive right, protect-
ing the possessor's privacy of thought; it will not
provide him with an unimpeded right to receive
obscene matter..
of the postal department, however. See Ex parle Jack-
son, 96 U.S. 727 (1877); Oliver v. United States, 239
F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1957); Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 1282
(1958).
CONTEMPT
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971)
In Mayberry v. PennsylvaniaO the Supreme
Court dealt with the judicial options available for
ending courtroom disruptions by a defendant.
The defendant Mayberry and two others were
accused of holding hostages in a state penal insti-
tution and of committing prison breach. The de-
fendants acted as counsel pro se throughout the
trial; their court-appointed counsel was requested
by the judge to act in an advisory capacity. Dur-
ing the twenty-one day proceedings, defendant
Mayberry complained bitterly of adverse rulings
from the bench, attacked the judge verbally and
instituted tactics which were intended to disrupt
the judge's instructions to the jury. When these
latter tactics succeeded, Mayberry was gagged
and strait-jacketed. Mayberry, however, con-
tinued his disruption and ultimately was removed
to an adjoining room from which he listened to the
conclusion of the trial over a public address sys-
tem. At the end of the trial, the jury returned a
verdict of guilty on both counts. Before passing
sentence, the trial judge summarily cited the de-
fendants for criminal contempt, finding defendant
Mayberry guilty of one or more contempts on
eleven of the twenty-one days. The judge then
sentenced Mayberry to not less than one nor more
than two years for each of the eleven contempt
citations, the sentences to run consecutively.2 The
1400 U.S. 455 (1971).
The specifications of contempt were:
1. suggesting that the court "has the intentions of
railroading us", that the judge was "being like a hatchet
man for the state", and calling the trial judge a "dirty
son-of-a-bitch," id. at 456;
2. telling the judge he didn't know how to rule on
questions and that "you ought to he Gilbert and Sul-
contempt sentence was affirmed by the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court.!
The United States Supreme Court vacated the
sentence and remanded the case, holding that a
judge who has been verbally attacked in court with
personal insults and who chooses to postpone con-
tempt proceedings until the trial's consummation
must step down from the ensuing contempt pro-
ceedings and allow a neutral judge to adjudicate
the contempt. 4 The Court also further refined the
alternatives for dealing with contempt which are
livan the way you sustain the district attorney each
time he objects to the questions," id. at 457;
3. shouting that the judge, a "dirty, tyrannical old
dog," would not railroad him into a life sentence id.
at 457;
4. requesting the judge to keep his mouth shut when
defendant is questioning his own witness, id. at 457-58;
5. calling the judge a bum and telling him, "Go to
hell. I don't.give a good God damn what you suggest,
you stumbling dog," id. at 458;
6. likening the courtroom to a penitentiary and
asserting that the judge was trying to deny him a fair
trial, id. at 459;
7. repeating the "Gilbert and Sullivan" charge,
charging the judge with conducting a "Spanish Inquisi-
tion," accusing the judge of railroading him into a life
sentence and of "trying to do a good job for the war-
den," and claiming that the judge was "a nut" who
needed 'some kind of psychiatric treatment," id. at 460;
8. stating, "This is the craziest trial I have ever
seen," id. at 461;
9. referring to the judge as a fool, id. at 461;
10. causing such an uproar as to be ejected from
the courtroom several times, id. at 461;
11. interrupting the court's charge to the jury, id.
at 462.
3 Mayberry Appeal, 434 Pa. 478,255 A.2d 131 (1969).
400 U.S. at 463-64.
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available to the trial court from the "arsenal of
authority" first set forth in Illinois v. Allen.5
An understanding of Mavberry's impact upon
the law of criminal contempt requires first an
examination of those cases which preceded May-
berry and upon which it rests. It is well-settled
law that in order to prevent a breakdown of the
judicial process, courts have the power to sum-
marily punish contemnors for contempts of court
which constitute personal attacks upon the trial
judge. 6 As early as 1888, the Supreme Court in
Ex parte Terry7 sanctioned a court's power to pro-
ceed upon its own knowledge of contempt com-
mitted in open court and to punish summarily for
that contempt.8 In Cooke v. United States,9 the
Court declared that summary punishment of
direct contempt does not mandate adherence to
traditional notions of due process of law. The
Court stated, "there is no need of evidence or
assistance of counsel before punishment, because
the court has seen the offense." 10 The court deter-
mined, however, that contempt not in facie curae
demands the same procedural safeguards as any
other criminal offense.
1'
5 397 U.S. 337 (1970). In Allen the court explicitly
held that
[a] defendant can lose his right to be present at
trial if, after he has been warned by the judge that
he will be removed if he continues his disruptive
behavior, he nonetheless insists on conducting
himself in a manner so disorderly.., that his trial
cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom.
Id. at 343.
The Court gave trial judges at least three options in
such cases: to bind and gag the defendant, to cite him
for contempt, or to take him from the courtroom until
he promises to conduct himself properly. Each of these
situations was present in Mayberry. As Justice Douglas
pointed out, however, Illinois v. Allen was decided
after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the
Mayberry contempt conviction. 400 U.S. at 463. See
also Flaum & Thompson, The Case of the Disruptive
Defendant, 61 J. CRIm. L.C. & P. S. 327 (1970).6 See 400 U.S. at 463; Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S.
575, 593 n. 1 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Sachar
v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
128 U.S. 289 (1888).
8 Id. at 293.
267 U.S. 517 (1925).
Id. at 534-35.
"The Court has emphasized since Cooke that only
"open contempts" are exempted from these due process
requirements. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948), pre-
sented the summary contempt citation of a witness by
a judge conducting a then-permissible "one man grand
jury," the witness having given testimony that "didn't
jell." Reversing the six-month sentence, the Supreme
Court found that this situation did not constitute an
open contempt:
[Tihe narrow exception to ... due process require-
ments includes only charges of misconduct, in
open court, in the presence of the Judge, which
The contemnor in Cooke, an attorney, requested
by letter that the presiding judge disqualify him-
self from the case, whereupon the attorney was
summarily cited for out-of-court contempt. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that since the
contempt was not one in open court, due process
of law required that the accused be advised of the
charges against him, provided with assistance of
counsel if requested, and afforded the right to call
witnesses in his own behalf.12 In dictum the Court
recommended that another judge preside over de-
layed summary contempt proceedings at the close
of trial."
In Sacker v. United States14 the Court spoke fur-
ther on the power of summary punishment for acts
of direct contempt. Sacker involved specifications
of contempt against attorneys for eleven Com-
munist party leaders for disruptive actions during
the trial of Dennis v. United States."5 Although the
contemnors conceded that they might have been
punished summarily if the trial judge had acted
instantly, they contended that the power of sum-
mary punishment expired when the judge failed
to cite them for contempt until after the verdict.
The Supreme Court, in enforcing the procedure
authorized by Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 42(a),16 held that a trial judge may punish
disturbs the court's business, where all of the es-
sential elements of the misconduct are under the
eye of the court.
Id. at 275-76.
12 Due process of law.., in the prosecution of
contempt, except that committed in open court,
requires that the accused should be advised of
the charges and have a reasonable opportunity
to meet them by way of defense or explanation.
We think this includes the assistance of counsel,
if requested, and the right to call witnesses to
give testimony, relevant either to the issue of
complete exculpation or in extenuation of the
offense and in mitigation of the penalty to be
imposed.
Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. at 537.
1" [Eixercise [of the power of contempt] is a deli-
cate one and care is needed to avoid arbitrary or
oppressive conclusions. This rule of caution is
more mandatory where the contempt charged
has in it the element of personal criticism or
attack upon the judge. The judge must banish
the slightest personal impulse to reprisal, but
he should not bend backward and injure the
authority of the court by too great leniency.
The substitution of another judge would avoid
either tendency but it is not always possible.
Id. at 539.
14343 U.S. 1 (1951).
15 341 U.S. 494 (1951).16 FE.a R. Calm. P. 42(a) reads:
(a). Summary Disposition. A criminal con-
tempt may be punished summarily if the judge
certifies that he saw or heard the conduct consti-
[Vol. 62
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summarily either at the time of the contempt, or
if required by the exigencies of the trial, at the end
of the trial.'7 The Court cautioned that to summon
before the bench a lawyer representing a client in
a pending case and pronounce him guilty of con-
tempt is "not unlikely to prejudice his client." Is
Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented, stating that
the trial judge had become too embroiled in con-
troversy with the contemnors to rule impartially
on the charges of contempt. Frankfurter found it
highly improper to permit the trial court to be
both accuser and judge in a separate proceeding
where he had been personally outraged by the
contemnor.19 Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting
language in Sacher was adopted by the Court in
Offunt v. United States.20 The Court there examined
the question of whether a judge who is "personally
involved" in the contempt may remain in the case
at all. The Court held that the district judge was
not qualified to sentence for contempt "where the
contempt charged is entangled with the judge's
personal feeling against the lawyer." 
2 '
In Illinois v. Allen22 the Supreme Court resolved
the question of whether an accused can claim the
benefit of confrontation while engaging in actions
rendering completion of his trial impossible. The
confrontation clause of the sixth amendement,
applicable to state proceedings, had theretofore
been viewed as granting the defendant the right to
be present at every stage of the trial.2 3 The Allen
Court explicitly held that a defendant who con-
tinues to engage in disruptive behavior, after
proper warnings, can lose the right to remain in
tuting the contempt and that it was committed
in the actual presence of the Court. The order of
contempt shall recite the facts and shall be signed
by the judge and entered of record.
17343 U.S. at 11.
18 Id. at 9-10.
" Id. at 28 (dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
20 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
21 Id. at 12-14. In Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575
(1964), however, the Court found no bias. In distin-
guishing its decision in Offutt, the Court reasoned that
the contemnor's disruptive commentary did not carry
such "potential for bias" as to require the judge's
disqualification. 376 U.S. at 584.
22 397 U.S. 337 1970.
23 The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment
of the United States Constitution states that "[iln all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him .... .." This clause is obligatory to state proceedings
under Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). In revers-
ing the Seventh Circuit's view that the right to be
present at trial is "absolute," 413 F.2d 232 (1969),
the Court in Allen stated: "We cannot agree that the
Sixth Amendment... or anv'... cases of this Court so
handicap a judge at trial." 397 U.S. at 342.
the courtroom. Therefore, remanding a defendant
to custody, binding and gagging an unruly defend-
ant, and removing the defendant from the court-
room were added to the options of summary and
delayed contempt 24
The issues raised in Mayberry were meticulously
examined by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
That court denied the necessity of a jury trial for
Mayberry's contempt sentence25 and ruled that
the trial judge had the plenary power to summarily
punish the defendant under Kx parle Terry and
Cooke v. United States.2 6 The court split, however,
on the question of cruel and unusual punishment.
While the majority dismissed the contention, not-
ing that such acts in open court are intended to
disrupt,27 Judge O'Brien, dissenting, posited that
it would be more realistic to view all the disruptive
acts as a single contempt. O'Brien would therefore
have found the eleven to twenty-two-year sentence
cruel and unusual.ss Finally, the Pennsylvania
court dealt with the question of whether the trial
judge had a duty to warn Mayberry each time his
conduct became contumacious. The court asserted
that even a layman would have known that his
conduct was in contempt of court, so due process
did not require that the court give separate warn-
ings.
9
In vacating the sentence, Justice Douglas's ma-
jority opinion stated that where a "vilified judge"
waits until the end of a trial to sentence a defend-
ant for contempt, he should permit another judge
2
(Mr. Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion,
indicated that if the Court's decision in Illinois v.
Allen had been available at the time of Mayberry's
trial, the trial judge could have dealt with the con-
temnor's disruptive tactics by stopping the trial and
citing the defendant for contempt, even though the
contempts were "personal." 400 U.S. at 469.
"The court conceded that a jury trial would have
been necessary under Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968), and Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968),
were those cases not inapplicable as prospective under
DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968). Mayberry
Appeal, 434 Pa. at 482, 255 A.2d at 133.
26 434 Pa. at 483-84, 255 A.2d at 134.
27 The instant record is replete with instance after
instance of contumacious conduct on Mayberry's
part. Moreover, it is evident beyond question
that such conduct was not only in defiance of
the court and its dignity but was planned with
a view to disrupting the orderly process of the
trial and preventing and obstructing the proper
administration of justice.
Under the instant circumstances, we conclude
that the imposition of eleven one-to-two-year
sentences is not cruel and unusual punishment.
Id. at 485-86, 255 A.2d at 135.
28 Id. at 487-88, 255 A.2d at 137.
2 Id. at 486, 255 A.2d at 135.
19711
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to preside over the contempt hearing.30 Justice
Douglas reasoned that the "fair administration of
justice" would be served by the recusation of a
judge subject to personal abuse, where a vengeful
judge might prejudice the contumacious defend-
ant's fourteenth amendment right to due process.3
More broadly, Mayberry was based upon the
view that "[jiustice must satisfy the appearance of
justice," as expressed in Offuti v. United States.2
Essential elements to promote "the appearance of
justice" in the instant case weie the length of the
sentence and the actions of the trial judge. Ap-
parently, Justice Douglas used the "appearance of
justice" standard to describe the "requirement" of
the fourteenth amendment. In Mayberry both the
length of the sentence and the "image" of an
abused judge seeking revenge did not meet the
"appearance of justice;" however, Justice Douglas
and Justice Harlan disagreed about the seriousness
of each factor. Justice Douglas stressed the con-
cept of image:
A judge, vilified as was this Pennsylvania judge,
necessarily becomes embroiled in a running,
bitter controversy. No one so cruelly slandered
is likely to maintain that calm detachment neces-
sary for fair adjudication.13
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan
focused on the length of the sentences:
These contempt convictions must be regarded as
infected by the fact that the unprecedented long
sentence of 22 years which they carried was im-
posed by a judge who himself had been the vic-
tim of petitioner's shockingly abusive conduct.
That circumstance seems to me to deprive the con-
tempt proceeding of the appearance of even-handed
justice which is the core of due process.34
Given the broad principles in the area of due proc-
0 400 U.S. at 465.
3 1 
Id.
348 U.S. 11, 17 (1954), quoted in 400 U.S. at 465.
33 400 U.S. 465. Justice Douglas later elaborated
on the image concept:
Many of the words leveled at the judge in the
instant case were highly personal aspersions, even
fighting words.... Insults of that kind are apt to
strike at the most vulnerable and human qualities
of a judge's temperament.... In the present case
... the judgment of contempt is vacated so that
on remand another judge, not bearing the sting of
these slanderous remarks and having the imper-
sonal authority of the law, sits in judgment on
the conduct of petitioner as shown by the record.
Id. at 466.311d. at 469 (emphasis added).
ess and the divergence of the views of Justices
Douglas and Harlan, lower courts will have to
consider both factors carefully to apply the May-
berry ruling accurately to other fact situations.3 5
A basic question in Mayberry was whether the
option to postpone contempt proceedings is an
effective method for restraining unruly defendants.
Justice Douglas qualified his reluctance to use sum-
mary contempt power when he stated that "[fin-
stant treatment of contempt where lawyers are
involved may greatly prejudice their clients but it
may be the only wise course where others are in-
volved." 36 Yet Mr. Justice Black, in a one-sentence
concurring opinion, rejected the possibility that the
judge could have convicted Mayberry of contempt
instantaneously with the outburst. Chief Justice
Burger, also concurring, noted that "[t]he con-
tempt... is of limited utility in dealing with an
incorrigible, a cunning psychopath, or an accused
bent on frustrating the particular trial or under-
mining the process of justice." He asserted, in
reference to the Allen "arsenal of authority," that
"[slummary removal from the courtroom is the
really effective remedy." - The Chief Justice added
that obstruction of justice statutes, where avail-
able, might also prove effective.3 9 Due to the dis-
agreement among the Justices as to the most
effective means for controlling a disruptive defend-
ant, it is not at all clear how useful the option
offered in Mayberry would be in applicable cases.
Knox v. Municipal Court of Des Moines0 is a
recent state court decision that illustrates the
problem of a defendant who insults the alternate
neutral judge who presides at the contempt hear-
ing as well as the trial judge. In Knox a defendant
15 It is clear, however, that outside factors may make
a situation so prejudicial as to demand that a trial
judge recuse himself in a post-trial contempt preceed-
ing. In Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212 (1971),
a post-Mayberry case, a civil rights worker was sum-
marily cited for contempt at trial. The judge, however,
although present in the courtroom at the time of the
alleged contumacious behavior, became aware of the
actions through second-hand reports. Although noting
that such judicial action directly conflicted with Oliver,
the Court proceeded to point out that the judge had
been the losing party in several suits filed by the civil
rights worker. Citing Mayberry, the Court demanded
a trial on the contempt charges, noting that "Trial
before an unbiased judge is essential to due process."
403 U.S. at 216.
50400 U.S. at 463.
37 Id. at 466. Mr. Justice Black believed that May-
berry could not be punished summarily without a jury
trial.
" Id. at 467.
3 Id. at 468.
40 Ia. -, 185 N.W.2d 705 (1971).
[Vol. 62
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accused of operating a motor vehicle with a sus-
pended license was openly antagonistic to the
trial judge and culminated his contumacious con-
duct by spitting at the judge after being sentenced.
Although the judge sentenced the defendant to
five of a possible thirty days for the traffic offense,
he still chose to transfer the contempt hearing to
another judge. Defendant Knox, however, was
again so disruptive that he was summarily cited
for contempt at the hearing; the second judge also
sentenced him to six months *after trial for the
first contempt. 41 The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed
the decision 4-3. The dissenters objected that
Knox's behavior in causing the first contempt
should not have been heard by the second judge,
since the second judge had himself been vilified at
the preliminary hearing. The dissenters argued
that according to Mayberry, the first contempt
should have been heard before a third judge after
the defendant vilified the second judge.4 The facts
in Knox indicate that use of the Mayberry option
with a determinedly disruptive defendant wastes
the court's time because the defendant can con-
tinue to abuse each succeeding judge at each con-
tempt hearing.
43
Another problem that arises from Mayberry
concerns the duty of the trial judge to warn the
'defendant that his conduct may be contumacious.
The trial judge in the Mayberry case did not cau-
tion the defendant at any point during the eleven
contemptuous incidents. Dismissing Mayberry's
argument that he should have been warned by the
trial judge immediately after each contemptuous
outburst, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rea-
soned that the defendant was aware of his out-
rageous conduct and deliberately planned it to be
disruptive." The Pennsylvania court's rationale,
however, begs the question of whether the "fair
administration of justice" or "the appearance of
justice" demands that the defendant be warned
of the possible ramifications of his actions. To be
sentenced without warning to a possible twenty-
41 The second judge also summarily sentenced the
defendant to six months for the second contempt.
42Id. at-, 185 N.W.2d at 717.
43 Assuming arguendo that the verbal attacks directed
at the second judge, combined with his later sentencing
of Knox to the maximum statutory penalty, made him
unqualified to sit at the contempt hearing for the
original contempt, the Iowa court's failure to remand
before a third judge was error under Mayberry.
" Mayberry Appeal, 434 Pa. at 488-89, 255 A.2d at
135. The court stated: "He knew his conduct was
outrageous and he deliberately planned such a course
of conduct."
two year sentence for engaging in disruptive con-
duct, on the theory that the defendant's willful
behavior satisfied the due process requirement of
notice, emphasizes Justice Harlan's concern that
the length of the sentence must satisfy "the ap-
pearance of even-handed justice."
In Mayberry the Court failed to consider the
length of sentence imposed and the related question
of the contemnor's right to jury trial before a new
judge. In Cheff v. Schnackenberg'5 the Court, exer-
cising its supervisory power over the federal
courts, required that a criminal contempt sentence
exceeding six months be tried by a jury. Duncan v.
Louisiana" provided that under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment a defendant
is entitled to a jury trial in any serious criminal
case. Applying the petty crime-serious crime dis-
tinction to criminal contempt, the Supreme Court
held in Bloom v. IllinoW7 that the sixth amend-
ment's right of trial by jury is guaranteed in cases
of "serious contempt." Postponement of sentenc-
ing for contempt until the end of trial before a
fellow judge should not deprive the contemnor of
a jury trial when the risk, as in Mayberry, greatly
exceeds the six-month limitation imposed in
Cheff. Yet Chief Justice Burger's concurring
language that "our holding that contempt cases
with penalties of the magnitude imposed here
should be heard by another judge," 4 implies that
such sentences can be meted out under the pro-
cedure outlined in Mayberry without affording the
contemnor a trial by jury.
49
The policy of having a judge who has been
personally abused by a defendant step down in
favor of a neutral judge was expressed initially in
the Cooke decision as dictum.n In Mayberry the
45 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
46 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
- 391 U.S. 194 (1968). Under Baldwin v. New York,
399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970), statutory authorization of a
penalty in excess of six months is a "serious" criminal
offense, requiring a jury trial. Baldwin, however, has
limited applicability in cases of federal contempt
and in states such as Pennsylvania, where there is no
statutorily established maximum sentence for direct
criminal contempts. See Commonwealth v. Snyder,
- Pa. -, 275 A.2d 312 (1971), in which the court
suggests looking to the actual sentence imposed where
no statutory maximum.exists. Id. at -, 275 A.2d at
317 (1971).
48 400 U.S. at 469.
"'See note 25 supra and accompanying text, where
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged that a
jury trial would be required if Duncan and Bloom had
been applied retroactively, each count being greater
than six months
10 See note 13 supra.
1971]
